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“GOOD GAMES”
Challenges for the War-Gaming Community
Stuart H. Starr

I

n 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization issued a technical report lay1
ing out a “Code of Best Practice” for command and control assessment. Although specifically aimed at command and control, this document offers a
framework for thinking about the changing nature of war gaming. In the
opinion of numerous practitioners and observers, war gaming has reached a
turning point: the changing basis of international security at the dawn of the
twenty-first century makes gaming an especially valuable tool, but a fundamental reformation of gaming is required for it to achieve its potential.
The Code of Best Practice, as a unifying and overarching framework, allows
us to take stock of the present state of war gaming, to highlight the primary challenges that the war-gaming community faces, and to propose steps to improve
every aspect of war gaming. It makes four central points.
First, as shown in figure 1, the framework of a good war game should be
broadly based on the principles of sound operational analysis. Thus the cornerstone of any game must be a clear and unambiguous formulation of the problem
to be addressed—the reason the game is to be played. A game’s sponsors need to
articulate very clearly the real issues of interest so that designers may develop
(for the sponsors’ approval) a conceptual framework within which these issues
can be suitably analyzed.
Second, as the Nato document instructs, the game’s designers should identify
and address organizational and cultural issues that
Dr. Starr is Director of Plans at the MITRE Corporation
emerge from the conceptual framework. What asin McLean, Virginia. An earlier version of this paper was
prepared for delivery at a war-gaming conference at the
sumptions are to be accepted, for example, about
Naval War College in March 2000.
the values, behavior, and decision processes of the
various players?
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Third, the war game must devise relevant scenarios. As is widely understood,
no single scenario is adequate for the full range of issues found in a major game.
Sponsors should expect to be presented with “families” of scenarios; a systematic
and efficient mechanism
FIGURE 1
to generate appropriate alWAR-GAMING FRAMEWORK
ternative scenarios allows
a game to focus on the
most interesting aspects of
Problem Formulation
Organization/Culture
the problem being studied.
Fourth, Nato’s Code of
Scenarios
Best Practice envisions
the use of “measures of
Measures of Merit
merit” to draw out insights
about the game’s results;
Data
Tools & Their Applications
for contemporary scenarios, hierarchies of interreReport
lated—and, increasingly,
Risk & Uncertainty
nontraditional—measures
are necessary. These measures, in turn, require the
collection of appropriate data and the application of suitable analytical tools to
be useful. For instance, ancillary tools can be used to perform analyses before a
game (perhaps to define fruitful parts of “scenario space”), during it (to assess
“moves”), and after it, especially to relate outcomes to measures of merit. The
Nato Code considers it vital to perform risk analyses to illuminate the uncertainties associated with the issues of interest to the sponsor; many a game participant (and sponsor) has drawn a misleading inference from the idiosyncratic
outcome of a single game. Finally, the results of the assessments must be documented, so there can be both peer reviews and a foundation upon which future
analyses can be built.
Although figure 1 does not formally specify it, the Code of Best Practice emphasizes that an extensive feedback arrangement is needed to share insights
among individuals carrying out these successive processes as game planning
progresses. Further, the overall team must be an interdisciplinary one—comprising operations analysts, war-game designers, experimental designers, computer scientists, social scientists, and so on—if it is to address all of the issues of
concern to a sponsor. A “good game,” then, blends clear problem formulation, technical virtuosity, accurate data, scenario creativity, appropriate decision
rules, and credible evaluation procedures. The rest of this article treats some of
these points in greater depth.
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PROBLEM FORMULATION
There is no shortage of problems amenable to useful analysis by war-gaming
techniques. In fact, policy makers are likely to find war gaming the most effective
tool for clarifying many issues and sets of issues that can be expected to come to
the foreground in the near and middle term. Let us here consider a few problems
for which war gaming could be particularly appropriate.
Strategic Visions. An indication of the variety of problems to which gaming
might be applied as an analytical tool is the set of three lists of strategic problems assembled recently by former secretary of defense William J. Perry and former assistant secretary of defense Ashton B. Carter, in their book Preventive
2
Defense. Their “A list” comprises potential (and possibly preventable) future
matters that could threaten the
The overall team must be an interdisciplinary survival, way of life, and position
in the world of the United States
one—comprising operations analysts,
(such as a resurgent and hostile
war-game designers, experimental designers,
computer scientists, social scientists, and so on. Russia, uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or catastrophic terrorism). The “B list” contains direct threats (deterrable
through ready forces) to vital American interests (for instance, major theater
wars). The “C list” cites problems (like Kosovo, Bosnia, and Somalia) that “indi3
rectly affect U.S. security but do not directly threaten U.S. interests.” Many of
these issues, particularly those on the “A list,” have yet to be explored adequately
in war games.
Homeland Defense. In its recent report, “Seeking a National Strategy: A Concept
for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom,” the congressionally established Hart-Rudman Commission emphasizes the need to enhance what it calls
4
“homeland security” to deal with emerging world threats. A third and final
phase of that study will address a variety of associated questions: Are responsibilities, authorities, and accountabilities clear? Do integrating mechanisms exist? What capabilities will be needed? Is the overall capacity sufficient, and if so,
5
will it continue to be? A suitably designed set of war games would be a promis6
ing way to illuminate these issues.
Operational Tempo. One of the driving issues in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense
Review was the necessity to devise “architectures” and personnel policies to allow U.S. forces to respond to operational demands that were expected to be high
enough to put pressure on unit training and maintenance, as well as morale and
retention. The “Dynamic Commitment” war game was developed and played to
address that issue; it is being revised to serve the same need for the Quadrennial
7
Defense Review of 2001. That game—which is to play a single scenario, drawn
randomly from a list of sixty-one “vignettes”—is itself a case in point, showing
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that contemporary gaming does not reflect sufficient understanding of risks and
uncertainties. The consequences of a particular vignette being played out in a
single game, and of drawing conclusions therefrom about levels of demands that
can be placed on U.S. equipment and personnel, are worrisome.
Service Transformation. Each of the military services is in the midst of sweeping
modernization designed to take advantage of opportunities offered by the information age. Specific initiatives include the Navy’s network-centric warfare, the
Army’s “Future Combat System for Smaller Scale Contingencies,” the air expeditionary forces of the Air Force,
How can scenarios be kept (in Albert Einstein’s and “Operational Maneuver from
the Sea” of the Marine Corps. War
formulation) as simple as necessary—
games have contributed to prebut no simpler?
liminary assessments of each of
these concepts singly, but there has been no attempt to game the totality of their
effects. Doing so would appear to be a high-priority matter.
Joint Vision 2020. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the recent doctrinal white paper Joint Vision 2020, conceives “a joint force capable of full spectrum dominance, persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any
8
form of conflict.” The document reaffirms as the prerequisite of full-spectrum
dominance four operational concepts—dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection—identified in an earlier white paper, Joint Vision 2010. These four operational concepts in turn
depend on three factors: interoperability (joint force, interagency, and multinational), innovation leading to transformation, and “decision superiority” (to allow commanders to “make better and faster decisions than their opponents”).
All of these factors, as well as their relationship to the central operational concepts of Joint Vision 2020, are very attractive subjects for gaming.
ORGANIZATION AND CULTURE
In games played by coalition allies prior to Operation DESERT STORM, differences
in cultures were sometimes recognized as a major factor. For instance, British
analyses reflected a particular appreciation of Iraqi characteristics that profoundly affected the planning and operational concepts of the British forces in
9
the theater.
Cultural differences were again acknowledged as central strategic factors in
1999, during Nato’s coercive air campaign to terminate internecine hostilities
in Kosovo. The subsequent debate about what actually prompted Slobodan
Milosevic’s acquiescence to Nato’s demands has produced at least one analysis of
10
the cultural and political dynamics of the Serbian leadership.
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It has been widely appreciated that war games require a much better theoretical basis than is now available for treating these matters in future conflict situations. One potential source of some necessary insight may emerge from work
being done in the Office of Naval Research on “Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control.” It examines the command-and-control staffs of various nations for pertinent “cultural artifacts” and their potential influence on decision
making. In addition, the war-gaming community would do well to draw on the
efforts of sociologists and political scientists, who could analyze the underlying
cultural forces at work in such recent operations as Somalia and Kosovo, and
who can be consulted in planning games for prospective involvement in foreseeable crises.
SCENARIOS
Today, basic issues in the selection and development of scenarios are being examined. Can a baseline scenario be used for a series (or “cluster”) of games?
How can scenarios be kept (in Albert Einstein’s formulation) as simple as necessary—but no simpler? Can “excursions” into important issues be accommodated, and if so, in what ways?
Clearly, no simple answers to these questions exist, but there is a fundamental
principle that game designers today should acknowledge—that no single scenario can adequately illuminate risk and uncertainty. The challenge is to develop
an efficient mechanism for finding and exploring regions of “scenario space”
where key factors play in significant ways. The Nato Code of Best Practice offers
one approach to the problem, a scenario framework that subsumes three major
categories—external factors (the political, military, and cultural situation), the
capabilities of actors (friendly and adversary forces, noncombatants), and the
environment (geography, terrain, and weather).
As an illustration of how such a framework might be used to develop a baseline scenario (and possibly scenario excursions), consider a methodology that
11
enumerates the factors applicable to a given game. For each of those factors, a
number of values (specific geographies, particular orders of battle, etc.) can be
assigned, each making a scenario more or less challenging in some respect that is
significant in terms of a game’s objectives. Between the bounding (“easy,” “very
difficult”) values for each factor lie the elements of a potentially interesting baseline scenario; alternative scenarios can be readily produced for sensitivity analyses by selecting different values for particular factors. In effect, this approach
generates a very large experimental-design matrix, each cell of which corresponds to a specific scenario. In traditional scientific experimentation, a number of iterations would be run for selected matrix cells in order to achieve
statistically meaningful results; statistical uncertainty would be a function of
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the number of cells examined and the number of independent trials of each. In
war games, of course, a “full factorial experiment” would be impossible; still, it
would be prudent to play at least a sampling of variants—a “sparse, fractional
factorial experiment.”
Closely related to scenarios is consideration of risk and uncertainty. As the
Code notes, a useful way to display and characterize areas of uncertainty in a
game is to play variations of the
scenario. In doing so, however, it
Today’s state-of-practice technology simply
is important to take account of,
collects stand-alone collaboration tools—
and offset, the effects of learning
however, the state of the art has advanced to
that occurs in the play of a game.
the point of integrating those capabilities into
For instance, the sequence of vari“virtual buildings.”
ations should anticipate and minimize the “carry forward” insights obtained in each variation; one way to do this
is to make the new problem appear different to the participants but have it contain the same essential stimuli. It will almost certainly not be possible to run
enough iterations to bound measures of merit as tightly as a physical scientist
would wish; nevertheless, to some extent well designed pre- and postgame analyses can refine those estimates.
A more basic issue is the estimation of risk. Risk analysis as a discipline is well
developed in a number of fields, such as the insurance industry and stock brokerages, but in the context of national security there is little agreement even
about the definition of risk itself. This is becoming a pressing issue, because the
congressional mandate of the Quadrennial Defense Review specifically requires
“a comprehensive discussion of [the] national defense strategy of the United
States and the force structure best suited to implement that strategy at a low to
12
moderate level of risk.” To meet this requirement the national security community will need to agree on definitions of risk, definitions that are amenable to
evaluation in future war games.
MEASURES OF MERIT
For decades gamers have employed the familiar operations-analysis device of
“measures of effectiveness” to structure game outcomes and relate them to
sponsors’ concerns. In recent years, however, the concept of measures of effectiveness has been broadened, resulting in the idea of “measures of merit.”13 As
discussed in the Nato document, this conception not only embraces the conventional measures of effectiveness but allows a linked hierarchy of increasingly
specific metrics to be considered as well. For example, the evaluation measures
of a game might employ measures each of which “nests” within the next to provide both broad and detailed attention as appropriate. An example follows:
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• Measures of policy effectiveness, assessing the extent to which the
participants in an operation are able to achieve national or international
security objectives;

• Measures of force effectiveness, examining the purely military effectiveness of
a force in terms of its primary task (such as the time required to halt an
attack);

• Measures of mission effectiveness, appraising the ability of the military force
to perform key subordinate or subsidiary missions;

• Measures of functional performance, evaluating the success of a particular
weapon system or command-and-control organization in important tasks,
such as target engagement;

• Dimensional parameters, the properties or characteristics (such as
bandwidth and resistance to jamming) of a specific system, such as a
communications network.
Game designers might usefully devise measures for each level of this hierarchy, and analysts might explore their relationships during the course of the
game. At the lower end of the hierarchy, extensive analyses have been performed
for traditional warfare; that literature is being expanded upon to embrace
14
information superiority. It would be necessary, however, to formulate meaningful measures of merit for the top of the hierarchy. In one promising effort in
this direction, economic measures were used to reflect the societal impact of
15
military operations. Participants were asked to estimate the effect that postulated crises might have on such indicators as the Dow Jones Industrial Average,
the price of a barrel of crude oil, or the exchange rate between the dollar and the
deutsche mark.
As the Nato Code of Best Practice concludes, games are not suitable for every
analytical question. Indeed, no single assessment technique is likely to be sufficient (see table 1). Since games are increasingly likely to address such concepts as
information superiority and information dominance, assessment tools must account for both friendly and adversary information processes. In addition, discipline is necessary; formal experimental-design matrices may be advisable, or
multiple iterations of increasingly fine-grained analytical routines may have to
be done (for instance, in successive attempts before a game to identify fruitful
aspects of the scenario environment, clarify assumptions, assign values for key
parameters, and model details).
Newly developed sophisticated collaboration tools may revolutionize war
games by allowing geographically dispersed individuals to participate fully in
deliberations and decisions. Today’s state-of-practice technology simply
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collects stand-alone collaboration tools—like video teleconferencing, shared
whiteboards, and Internet chat rooms. However, the state of the art has advanced to the point of integrating those capabilities into “virtual buildings” in
which participants interact in real time. Efforts are under way to improve
“scalability” (usefulness for various numbers of players and complexities of scenario) and to deal with security issues regarding the transmission of game data.
TABLE 1
SPECTRUM OF CANDIDATE ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES

Typical
Application

Systems

Analysis

Closed Form;
Statistical

Analytical

Constructive

Force on Force
Models;
Communication
Systems

Virtual

Lead Time

Ops/
Mission

Resources

Assumed or
Simulated

Simulated

Simulated

Assumed or
Simulated

War games;
Human in
the Loop

Simulated

Live

CPX*
FTX**

Actual Ops

After Action Reports;
Lessons Learned

Techniques

People

Credibility
Create

Use

Relatively
Modest

Weeks to
Months

Weeks to
Months

Fair to
Moderate

Simulated

Moderate

Months to
Years

Weeks to
Months

Moderate

Real

Simulated

High

Months to
Years

Weeks to
Months

Moderate to
High

Real

Real

Real or
Simulated

Very High

Years

Weeks to
Months

High

Real

Real

Real

Extremely
High

N/A

N/A

Very High

*CPX-Command Post Exercise
**FTX-Field Training Exercise

One of the major advantages that these emerging collaborative gaming tools
offer is the possibility that principals—commanders, heads of agencies, senior
executives—will be able to participate personally. The demands on the time of
such individuals normally make it difficult for them to get involved in war
games, especially if travel is involved; typically they must delegate such matters
to subordinates. Distributed, collaborative war-gaming technologies will make
it possible for actual decision makers to play, increasing both the fidelity of the
games and the real value of the entire activity by educating the principals directly about the intricacies and nuances of the problems being considered.
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